Recently, Galí and others find that technological progress may be contractionary: a favorable technology shock reduces hours worked in the short run. We ask whether this observation is robust in disaggregate data. According to our VAR analysis of 458 four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries for 1958-1996, some industries do exhibit temporary reduction in hours in response to a permanent increase in TFP. However, there are far more industries in which technological progress significantly increases hours. Using micro data on average price duration, we ask whether the difference across industries is related to the stickiness of industry-output prices.
Introduction
Despite controversies regarding its quantitative importance as a source of business-cycle fluctuations, the employment effect of technology is conventionally viewed as expansionary; technological progress not only expands the production frontier but also creates jobs.
Recently, however, a number of studies-initiated by Galí (1999) , Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (1998) , and Kiley (1998) and reinvestigated by Francis and Ramey (2002) -report that favorable technology shocks may reduce total hours worked in the short run. This is an important finding because, if confirmed, the fluctuation induced by technological progress may violate a simple fact of the business cycle-the co-movement of output and employment, documented at least since Burns and Mitchell (1946) . 1 In this paper, we investigate whether this observation is robust at a more disaggregate level.
According to our VAR analysis of 458 four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries for 1958-1996, some industries exhibit a decrease in hours worked in response to a favorable technology shock, identified by a stochastic trend component of total factor productivity (TFP). However, there are far more industries in which a permanent increase in TFP leads to a significant increase in both employment and hours per worker in the short run. Among 458 four-digit industries, 148 industries exhibit a statistically significant increased hours of work in response to a favorable technology shock, whereas only 13 industries exhibit significant decreases in hours worked in the short run.
1 In Galí as well as in Kiley, and Francis and Ramey, a technology shock is identified by a stochastic trend of labor productivity from a structural VAR. Basu et al. construct a measure of technology change from production functions, controlling for imperfect competition, utilization, and aggregation effects. In contrast, Shea (1998) , distinctive for his use of a direct measure of technology, finds that an increase in the orthogonal components of R&D and patents tends to increase input use, especially labor, in the short run, but to reduce inputs in the long run.
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Our results differ from Kiley's, which shows that employment decreases in response to a permanent increase in labor productivity in most two-digit manufacturing industries for 1968:II-1995:IV.
However, we do not view these findings necessarily conflicting. We find that the stochastic trends of TFP and labor productivity capture different types of changes in production because labor productivity reflects changes in input mix as well as improved efficiency. For instance, disturbances affecting material-labor or capital-labor ratios (e.g., persistent movement of relative input price changes or trends in sectoral labor supply) generate a negative correlation between labor productivity and hours along the downward sloping marginal product of labor whereas such changes alone do not affect the TFP.
As the contractionary effect of technology is incompatible with a baseline equilibrium model, alternative models have been proposed. Our analysis sheds light on two alternative hypotheses: sticky prices (Galí, Kiley, and Basu et al.) and labor-saving technological progress (Francis and Ramey). Intuitively speaking, if prices do not fall, demand remains unchanged and firms need less input due to the improved technology. 2 We test this hypothesis by asking whether the crosssectional difference in an industry's hours response (to a technology shock from the VAR) can be accounted for by the stickiness of industry-output prices (average duration of prices) constructed by Bils and Klenow (2002) . For 87 manufacturing goods, which we are able to match with the employment and TFP in the NBER Database, we do not find a systematic correlation between the industry's hours response and the average duration of product price. Francis and Ramey illustrate that under a strong complementarity between capital and labor, demand for labor input may decrease in the short run in the face of labor-saving technological progress. On one hand, we find that the labor share has indeed decreased significantly in manufacturing in the past four decades (from .57 in 1958 to .38 in 1996) suggesting a presence of labor-saving technological change in manufacturing. On the other hand, our data suggests that under a strong complementarity (e.g., substitution elasticity between capital and labor as low as .5), the decline of labor shares may be accounted for by the relatively slow accumulation of capital in manufacturing as the measured capital-effective labor ratios had decreased by almost 50 percent during the sample period.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe our empirical method, including the VAR and data, and report the estimates on the technology effect on hours. In Section 3, we compare the stochastic trends of TFP and labor productivity, providing a reconciliation with previous studies. In Section 4, we relate our results to the two hypotheses that allow for a negative response of hours to technology. Section 5 provides caveats on our analysis. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 Evidence from Industry TFP and Hours
Identifying Technology Shocks
Following the tradition of Blanchard and Quah (1989) and earlier works (e.g., Galí, Kiley), technology shocks are identified by a structural VAR of productivity, x t , and hours, n t . Fluctuations of industry productivity and hours are driven by two fundamental disturbances-technology and non-technology shocks-which are orthogonal to each other. Only technology shocks can have a permanent effect on the level of industry productivity. Both technology and non-technology shocks 3 can have a permanent effect on industry hours. We do not attempt to provide an interpretation of non-technology shocks, which can be either aggregate (e.g., monetary shocks) or sectoral (e.g., reallocation shocks). 3 We assume that the vector [∆x t , ∆n t ] can be expressed as a (possibly infinite) distributed lag of both types of disturbances:
where x t and n t denote, respectively, the sequence of technology and non-technology shocks. The orthogonality assumption (combined with a standard normalization) implies E t t = I. Our identifying restriction corresponds to C 12 (1) = 0. The specification (1) is based on the assumption that industry hours and productivity are integrated of order one, which holds in most manufacturing industries. Note that we do not impose a stationarity of hours (often adopted at the aggregate level based on the balanced-growth path assumption). We also consider an alternative measure which is stationary: the de-trended average workweek of production workers of the industry. In this case,
we estimate an analogous model for [∆x t , n t ] , where n t denotes deviations of weekly hours from a linear time trend. The main conclusion of the paper is not affected by the choice of hours. 4 Industry output reflects the value of shipment divided by the price deflator of industry output. 5 For hours worked, we use total hours employed in the industry, measured by the sum of hours of production and non-production workers. There are no data on workweeks for non-production workers. We follow the NBER Database's convention of setting the workweek for non-production workers equal to 40. We obtain a similar result when we assume that hours of non-production workers are perfectly correlated with those of production workers. Figure 1 displays the responses of TFP and hours for the aggregate manufacturing industry. In response to a one-standard-deviation technology shock (which eventually increases the manufacturing TFP by 2.8 percent), hours worked increases by .7 percent at impact. Hours continues to rise for two years until it reaches the new steady state, 1.7 percent higher than before. In response to a non-technology shock, the manufacturing industry experiences a temporary increase of TFP, suggesting a pro-cyclical factor utilization. Hours worked increases and remains high. We obtain similar results with stationary hours, the (linearly de-trended) average workweek of production workers. The average workweek increases in the short run in response to both technology and non-technology shocks.
Data

Results
While we find similar responses for durables and nondurables, the hours response varies vastly across industries. For example, in "Transportation Equipment," hours increases almost by 7 percent in response to a technology shock which increases the TFP by 4 percent in the long run;
whereas hours falls and persistently remains low in response to a technology shock in "Agricultural Chemicals" (Figure 2 ). The conditional correlation reflects the overall response of hours to a technology shock. As our primary interest is in the short-run response, in Table 2 we summarize the number of industries with positive and negative contemporaneous response of hours to technology from the bi-variate industry VARs. The numbers in parentheses represent the cases that are statistically significant at 7 Following Galí, we compute the conditional correlation on technology based on VAR estimates. Given an estimate for C(L), estimates of conditional correlations are obtained as: Despite considerable heterogeneity across sectors, the employment effect of technology does not appear strongly inconsistent with the equilibrium view: technological progress tends to increase the demand for labor. However, its quantitative importance for the cyclical variation of hours (in terms of the forecast error variances from the VAR) is small: technology shocks account for less than 20 percent of two-year volatility of hours growth in manufacturing. 8 
TFP vs. Labor Productivity
Our result-hours worked increases in response to a trend component of TFP-appears at odds with
Kiley's, which shows that the technology-driven components of labor productivity and employment are negatively correlated for 15 of the 17 two-digit manufacturing industries for 1968:II-1995:IV.
However, we do not see our results as necessarily in conflict with Kiley's. In Kiley as well as in Galí technology shocks are identified by the stochastic trends of labor productivity. In fact, when we use labor productivity (instead of TFP), we also find a strong negative response in hours in most industries, consistent with Kiley.
In this section, we provide an explanation for this difference by showing that the stochastic trends of labor productivity and TFP reflect different types of changes in production process over time. Figure 3 exhibits TFP, labor productivity (value-added divided by total hours), and total hours worked in manufacturing for 1958-1996. While both TFP and labor productivity show positive trends, the magnitudes are somewhat different. To illustrate, suppose the labor-augmenting technology, denoted by X t , grows at rate g. If the balanced growth property were held, output, capital, and labor productivity would grow at rate g and the measured TFP, Z t , would grow at rate αg, where α is labor share. Given the average labor share of .5 in manufacturing during the sample period, the labor productivity should have grown twice as fast as the measured TFP to be consistent with the balanced growth path. Yet in the last 40 years, TFP has doubled and labor productivity has tripled. In other words, the balanced growth path predicts that the capitaleffective labor ratio (
) is stationary. However, this ratio has decreased significantly (almost by 50 percent) in aggregate manufacturing from 1958 to 1996.
The difference between the two productivity measures is dramatic in some industries. In "Leather and Leather Products" no trend appears in the TFP shown in Figure 4 , whereas labor productivity exhibits a strong trend caused by a continuous decrease in employed hours over time.
For aggregate manufacturing, we could not reject the null-hypothesis of no co-integration between TFP and labor productivity at 10 percent significance level. The null-hypothesis of no co-integration is not rejected at 10 percent for 17 of the 20 two-digit manufacturing industries.
Consider a production function
output, labor, capital, material, and TFP, respectively. With lowercase letters for logged values, the growth rate of labor productivity ∆(y t − n t ) is:
where α n,t denotes output elasticity of labor, and so forth. These elasticities, measured by the average revenue shares at time t and t − 1, are allowed to vary over time to accommodate a factorbiased technological progress.
Given the technology, as hours increases the labor productivity decreases along the downward sloping marginal product of labor (α n < 1). In general, labor productivity growth can reflect improved technology, decreased hours of work, or increased use of other inputs. Thus, changes in material-labor and capital-labor ratios due to shifts in input prices affect labor productivity, whereas such changes alone will not affect the TFP.
In order to understand the extent to which input growth accounts for labor productivity growth, we decompose the stochastic trend of labor productivity into the input growth and TFP growth based on (2). We first expand the VAR to include other inputs such as capital and material: and α m C 14 (1), respectively, for labor, capital, and material.
According to Model A (in which technological progress is identified by the permanent components of TFP) in Table 3 , a permanent TFP shock increases the labor productivity by a similar magnitude in the long run, as the contributions of inputs on labor productivity tend to offset each other. For aggregate manufacturing, a 2.76 percent increase (caused by a one-standard-deviation shock from the VAR) of labor productivity is decomposed into -.51 percentage points due to an increased hours of work ((α n − 1)∆n), -.26 due to a decreased capital (α k ∆k), .77 due to an increased material (α m ∆m), and 2.76 due to an improvement in TFP (∆T F P ). A similar pattern is found across two-digit industries; the labor productivity and TFP grow in a similar magnitude in the long run.
By contrast, when labor productivity is used (Model B) to identify technology, a significant portion of labor productivity is explained by an input growth. For aggregate manufacturing, a 4 percent increase in output per hours (caused by a one-standard deviation shock from the VAR)
consists of 2.44 percentage points due to an increase in TFP, .28 due to decreased hours, -.08 due decreased capital, and 1.36 due to increased material. In nondurables, hours plays a more important role. For a 3.25 percent increase of labor productivity, a 1.49 percentage point increase is due to increased TFP and a .79 percentage point increase is due to decreased hours. Overall, about half of the trend in labor-productivity is accounted for by the input growth in manufacturing.
Implications for Two Alternative Hypotheses
The industry VAR analysis reveals a considerable heterogeneity across sectors in the hours response to technology. A negative response, in particular, is apparently inconsistent with the prediction of the baseline (flexible-price) equilibrium model. Alternative models have been proposed to allow for a negative response of hours to technological progress. In this section we document some facts that provide implications for two alternative hypotheses: sticky prices (Galí, Kiley, and Basu et al.) and labor-saving technological progress (Francis and Ramey). 
Sticky Prices
Intuitively speaking, when price is fixed, the demand for goods remains unchanged and firms need fewer inputs, including labor, to produce the same amount of output thanks to the improved TFP.
We test this hypothesis by asking whether the industry response of hours (to technology shocks) from a VAR is systematically correlated with the stickiness of industry-output price.
We take advantage of the recent micro data constructed by Bils and Klenow (2002) , who compute the average monthly price-change frequency for 350 goods and services from unpublished data on the price quotes collected by the BLS for 1995-1997. We exploit the cross-sectional variation in these measures. For 87 manufacturing goods, we are able to match the SIC industry classification with the ELIs. 10 In matching the two data sets, each ELI corresponds to a four-digit SIC industry for 44 goods. For 11 goods, one ELI item corresponds to multiple four-digit SIC industries. In this case, we aggregate TFP (weighted by value-added output) and hours of the industries. For 32 goods, multiple ELIs belong to one three-or four-digit SIC industry. In this case, the CPI weights from the BLS are used to calculate the average price-change frequency of the goods. The average duration of price (the inverse of average price-change frequency) for 87 goods is 3.4 months.
Gasoline is at the flexible end of the spectrum with an average duration of 0.8 months; newspapers are at the sticky end with an average duration of 29.9 months.
In Figure 5 , we plot the short run response of hours to a technology shock against the (log) average monthly duration of prices for 87 manufacturing goods. The short run response refers to the contemporaneous effect on hours of a technology shock that increases the industry TFP by one 10 To calculate the CPI, the BLS collects prices for about 71,000 non-housing goods and services per month. These are collected from around 22,000 outlets across 44 geographic areas. The BLS divides non-housing consumption into roughly 350 categories called "entry-level items" (ELIs).
percent in the long run. Under the sticky-price hypothesis we expect a negative correlation between the hours response and average price duration. However, no systematic relationship appears; the cross-sectional correlation between the hours responses and average duration of prices is .02. We repeat the same plot (the right panel), now with y-axis representing the hours response to a shock that increases the labor productivity by one percent in the long run (based on VARs of hours and labor productivity). Again, we do not find a systematic relation between the hours response and average duration of price.
Our evidence-a near zero correlation between price duration and the VAR statistics-does not reject a potential role of sticky price for the propagation mechanism of business-cycle fluctuations.
However, it suggests that price stickiness may not be a primary reason for firms' use of labor input differently across industries in the face of permanent changes in technology. 11 
Labor-Saving Technological Progress
Technological changes often accompany substitution of inputs in production (e.g., factor-biased technological progress). Francis and Ramey show that labor-saving technological progress may decrease hours worked under a strong complementarity between capital and labor. Consider a CES production function that nests Francis and Ramey:
Here Y t denotes the value-added output, X t , a labor-augmenting technological progress, and σ the substitution elasticity between capital and labor. In Francis and Ramey, the production technol- 
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ogy is a Leontief (σ = 0) and the labor-saving technological progress refers to an increase in X t associated with a decrease in α t . The first order conditions of a firm's cost minimization imply:
where W t and R t denote wage rate and rental rate for capital. The factor-share ratio (
the output-input elasticity ( α t 1−αt ) and the capital-effective labor ratios (
. If the production function is a Cobb-Douglas (σ = 1), capital-labor ratio has no impact on factor shares; the labor share simply reflects a technological change in α. However, when capital and labor are complements (σ < 1), a decrease in capital-effective labor ratio decreases the labor share relative to capital.
We note two observation in manufacturing in the last four decades. First, the labor share (in value-added) has significantly decreased in manufacturing (from .57 in 1958 to .39 in 1996).
Second, the capital-labor ratio has not kept up with the measured TFP. Given the time series of factor shares, capital-labor ratios, and X t (based on the TFP in Section 2), one can compute the implied values of α t over time that satisfy the equation (4). 12 Figure 6 shows the implied times series of α t , respectively, with σ of 2/3, 1, and 1.5 for aggregate manufacturing. This range of σ includes the empirically plausible values for U.S. manufacturing (Lucas, 1969; Berndt, 1976) .
The implied values of α t has indeed decreased over time, supporting the mechanism proposed by Francis and Ramey. Even when capital and labor exhibit a fairly low degree of substitutability (σ = 2/3), almost half of the decline of labor shares are attributed to the decrease of α t . However, a too strong complementarity (such as Leontief) may rule out the role of α t in the downward trend of labor shares because the capital-labor ratio has not grown as fast as the labor-augmenting 12 The measured TFP is adjusted by the (two-period average) labor shares to be consistent with the equation (3):
14 productivity in manufacturing. (Recall (3).) For example, when σ = .5, the observed decline of labor share is consistent with a constant α because
NtXt has decreased by almost 50 percent during the sample period. (Hall, 1987) . 13 Suppose the growth rate of the "true" TFP is ∆z * t and the markup is µ. The measured TFP growth (incorrectly assuming a markup of 1) is:
Some Caveats
If the actual markup is above 1, the measured TFP is spuriously correlated with inputs. In Table 4 , we re-estimate the bi-variate VAR of hours and TFP adjusted for the markup of 1.1 and
based on (5).
With the makeup ratio of 1.1, the result remains the same: technology shocks tend to increase hours worked in the short-run. When the markup is 1.2, fairly high given the small profit rates in manufacturing, a permanent increase in TFP now has a negative impact on hours in the short run and virtually no effect on hours in the long run. However, we are concerned that too high a markup may generate a spurious negative correlation between the corrected TFP and inputs.
Second, our analysis is based on the gross output. The contribution of material input does not appear in the net output measure such as value added. When the value added measures are used, the stochastic trends in TFP and labor productivity do not diverge so much as in the gross output measure. 14 Nevertheless, dissimilarity between the two measures persists in manufacturing.
In a bi-variate VAR of aggregate manufacturing, hours increases by .32 percent initially and by .85 percent in the long run in response to a one-standard-deviation permanent TFP shock (which eventually increases the TFP by 8.9 percent). The conditional correlation between hours and the permanent component of TFP is .57 (with standard error of .43). By contrast, hours decreases 13 We thank Jordi Galí for suggesting this exercise.
14 The value-added-based TFP growth of the industry is obtained by ∆e z = ∆z 1−αm as suggested in Basu and Fernald (1999) , where ∆z is TFP growth based on gross output. This implicitly assumes a Leontief technology between value added output and material input.
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by .89 percent initially but increases by .1 percent in the long run in response to a permanent labor productivity shock (which eventually increases the labor productivity by 5.9 percent). The conditional correlation of hours and permanent components of labor productivity is -.58 (with standard error of .22).
Finally, our data are limited to manufacturing, no longer a major sector of the U.S. economy.
When the aggregate (nonfarm business sector) TFP and hours are used, hours worked slightly decreases (statistically not significant) in response to a permanent TFP shock (Table 4) . However, as Figure 7 shows, we still see a difference in the hours responses; a permanent labor productivity shock generates a much more pronounced negative response of hours. Given the considerable heterogeneity within manufacturing, it appears that more research on micro and historic datasuch as Gort and Klepper (1982) , Grilliches and Lichtenberg (1984) , Kortum (1993) , Shea (1998 
Conclusion
Based on aggregate time series of labor productivity and hours, Galí and many others report that favorable technology shocks may reduce hours worked in the short run, which is apparently incompatible with the baseline equilibrium model. We investigate whether this finding is robust in more disaggregated data.
According to our analysis of 458 U.S. manufacturing industries for 1958-1996, hours response varies vastly across industries. Many industries exhibit reduction in hours in response to a permanent increase in TFP, consistent with earlier studies. However, there are far more industries in which technological progress leads to a significant increase in hours both in the short and long run.
We provide a reconciliation with earlier studies by showing that the stochastic trends of labor productivity and TFP reflect different changes in production in manufacturing as labor productivity reflects changes in input mix as well as improved efficiency.
Our analysis sheds some light on two hypotheses that allow for a negative response of hours to technology: sticky prices and labor-saving technological progress. For 87 manufacturing goods, the cross-sectional correlation between the hours response (to technology) and the measure of price stickiness (average duration of output price) is close to zero. We find that about half of the observed downward trends in labor shares in manufacturing may be due to technological changes in the form of labor saving. While considerable work remains to be done, the employment effect of technology in U.S. manufacturing does not seem strongly inconsistent with the prediction of the equilibrium view. Note: The top panels show the responses of aggregate TFP and hours to a (one-standarddeviation) permanent TFP shock; the bottom panels show those of aggregate labor productivity and hours to a (one-standard-deviation) permanent labor productivity shock. The dotted lines represent the 90 percent confidence intervals based on bootstrapping 500 draws.
